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1 Introduction
In a referendum held late fall 1994, the Norwegians decided not to join the European Union. During
the preceding months, a controversial debate among economists on the potential welfare effects of a
membership seemed to draw considerable attention from the general public. Transforming the present
European Economic Area (EEA) Treaty into a full membership was believed to primarily affect three
areas of economic activity. First, in order to adjust to the CAP system of the EU, a significant reform
of the agricultural policy would be necessary. Second, an estimated net contribution to the common
budget which represents about 1 per cent of the Norwegian GDP (close to 1 billion ECU) along with
substantial changes in the structure of indirect taxes would adversely affect the balance of the
government budget. Third, full participation in the tariff union as well as the single market would
require a significant trade policy reform (including the policy towards third countries).
Although a completion of the single European market is regarded as an important milestone in the
continuing integration of Europe and a tremendous amount of research has been devoted to explore the
welfare effects of further integration', only a small number of studies have focused on the effects of
the ongoing EFTA/EU integration. With respect to Norway, two model simulations performed by
Haaland (1992, 1994) assess overall welfare effects of a full economic integration with the European
Union. As in most other analyses of economic integration and trade liberalisation, both of these studies
apply computable general equilibrium models based on a static (or ad-hoc dynamic) framework. The
models are generally calibrated to a base year, using externally provided estimates of core elasticity
parameters and other central variables. Yet, we claim that the most severe problem with the majority
of the earlier studies, is that they ignore the effects of international lump-sum transfers due to
membership contribution rules. The fact that all the EFTA countries (both the new members of the EU
and those remaining outside) were potentially large net contributors to EU's common budget is a result
of the way a contribution is calculated. In brief terms, the net contribution2 is positively correlated
with a country's GDP level and its value added tax (VAT) revenues, whereas it is negatively
correlated with the size of it's agricultural sector (see section 3.2.2 for more on these calculations).
Compared to the EU members (EU-12), none of the EFTA countries are large in agricultural
production, but most of them have substantially higher VAT rates than the EU-12 average, see Tait
(1988). Hence, the aspect of the nation's initial economic structure appears to be crucial when
studying the overall effect a potential EU-membership. Although this question is somewhat outdated
with respect to Sweden, Finland and Austria, the problem is still highly salient when it comes to the
case of Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.
I See e.g. Winters (1992) for a summary of these studies
2 Calculations of the net contribution is formally presented in Table 2.
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In this paper we employ a large scale macroeconometric model, MODAG 3, to analyse both transitory
adjustment problems and long term welfare effects of adapting the Norwegian economy to the
necessary structural and political changes as outlined in the Accession Treaty (1994). The model
specifies a rather disaggregated production and consumption structure in addition to a detailed
description of the tax structure and public sector fmances. A data coherent specification of the
dynamic structure of the Norwegian economy allows us to simulate both medium and long term effects
from which conclusions on an intertemporal welfare measure can be drawn. When studying shifts in
economic policy within a European context, it is highly important to explicitly model a labour market
that allows for unemployment. The fact that MODAG captures this aspect gives reason to believe that
the paper may contribute to the understanding of medium term structural effects of reforming trade and
protection policies as well as the economic consequences of international lump sum transfers.
We design two alternative scenarios for the Norwegian economy; one membership scenario and one
scenario that represents Norwegian prospects outside the Union. Both scenarios cover the period from
1995 to 2020. The future course of the European Union will of course be important for Norway, and
the effects on the economy may depend upon the membership status. Yet, rather than to assess
consequences for the Norwegian economy of different uncertain future European development
scenarios, we compare full membership in the Union as it is today with the features of the present
EEA-treaty. Since adaptation to new circumstances is both costly and time consuming, a dynamic
approach is highly warranted. In section 4 below we draw conclusions on both transitory and long run
effects of an EU-membership with emphasis on consumption possibilities measured in present value
terms. For expository purposes we first analyse the «pure» integration effects, which means that we
temporarily ignore the costs associated with Norway's net contribution to the common budget.
According to our model, these costs depend on what kind of government measures are taken to offset
the adverse effects on the current account and public sector balance due to the transfer payment. This
point is illustrated separately.
Even if full integration of the Norwegian economy into the single European market is beneficial in the
long run, according to our calculations, the present value of the reform seems to be negative when the
cost of the Norwegian net contributions is included. This is especially so, if fiscal policy is changed to
maintain the public sector budget balance. In addition to the financial charge, the cost of the reform
would mainly be associated with under-utilisation of resources in a comparatively long transition
period. The equilibrating forces of MODAG work slowly due to rigidities in the labour market and
small absolute values of the price elasticities of foreign trade. Since these estimates may be criticised
3 Cappelen (1992) presents a rigorous description of the model and its applications.
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on theoretical grounds, we present a sensitivity analysis of the importance of these parameters for the
simulation results. We find that not even large changes in the parameter values affect our qualitative
conclusions.
Kokko (1994) emphasises the link between economic integration and increased investment. First, a
membership is believed to increase investment through improved productivity promoted by increased
competition. Second, compared to the EEA treaty, a membership is believed to stabilise the investment
environment (i.e. reduced =certainty) and attract foreign direct investments. The first effect is covered
in this work but not the second. The EEA treaty ensures the existence of an equivalent competition
policy as well as the free movement of goods, services and factors between Norway and the EU. The
political and economic conditions can be regarded as highly stable in all Nordic countries. Hence, the
important question seems to be whether foreign investors are aware of the EEA treaty and its
legislative content. Recently, some alleged examples of discouraged investment effects may indicate
that this knowledge is not complete. However, there is reason to believe that the problem will diminish
over time. With these considerations in mind and the fact that such discouraged investment effects are
hard to measure, we find it reasonable to not include these aspects in our study.
The model is presented and discussed in light of other studies of European integration in section 2.
Assumptions behind the construction of the two alternative paths are presented in section 3. Here we
focus on the four areas of economic activity that are subject to the most important changes. The
simulations and sensitivity tests are found in section 4, whereas section 5 concludes.
2 The model and some comparisons to earlier contributions
Apparently, most studies of economic integration are based on partial or general equilibrium models.
Although such models rest on a consistent and frequently sophisticated theoretical foundation, they are
often unable to account for important empirical aspects of the economy. More specifically, previous
model simulations assessing the welfare effects of a single country joining the European integration
process apply static equilibrium theory, see e.g. Haaland (1992, 1994) on Norway, Antille et al. (1993)
on Switzerland, Norton et al. (1986) on Portugal, Pantelis, Karadeloglou and Mentzas (1991) on
Greece and Miller and Spencer (1977) on UK's entry. It is evident that studies based on static models
can hardly provide conclusions that incorporate important transitional adjustment problems with
respect to resource allocation and market rigidities& Furthermore, when analysing the European
economy, it is difficult (and dangerous) to ignore the existence of unemployment. Several CGE studies
4 Some recent studies presented by Mercenier and Akitoby (1993) and Keuschnigg and Kohler (1995) apply
dynamic general equilibrium models with imperfect competition to assess the intertemporal effects of integration
and trade liberalisation on welfare and trade.
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do consider the labour market but in a most perfunctory or implicit way. For instance, Mercenier
(1995) employs a multi country CGE model to ask whether 4992» can reduce unemployment in
Europe. However, the model is not specifically designed to study the labour market as it only allows
for either fixed employment or fixed wages.
In the present analysis, we apply the relatively disaggregated (29 sectors-40 commodities)
macroeconometric model MODAG developed by Statistics Norway. The model allows for increasing
returns to scale in the production sectors (an aspect consistent with most of the studies mentioned
above) and utilises estimated wage equations to determine labour market conditions. The model
structure is not designed to evaluate the effect of a trade policy reform on the competitive structure
among producers, nor does it explicitly allow for changes in labour supply due to economic
integration. It is our impression, however, that since the difference between the EEA-treaty and an
EU-membership does not suggest any significant changes in these conditions, this deficiency is really
not important. Below we give a stylised description of the equation structure of MODAG. The
disaggregated input-output framework and most of the dynamic structure are suppressed in this
exposition.
Foreign and Norwegian goods and services are treated as imperfect substitutes, and foreign trade is
modelled by Armington equations. Net export (NE) is a function of foreign demand (GDPfor),
domestic demand (GDPdo,n) and prices of Norwegian goods relative to foreign goods (PdoidPf,).
(1) PNE = fi (GDP4., GDP„
Pfor
The price elasticities for exports and imports are on average 1.7, and both elasticities with respect to
demand exceed one. There are three prices for each good in the model: the import price (exogenous),
the domestic price and the export price. Costs are the dominant factor in determining domestic prices.
For export prices foreign prices play a larger role. Domestic prices and export prices are determined as
a mark-up over unit variable costs (UVC), where mark-ups depend on the price of foreign goods and
the rate of capacity utilisation (CU):
(2) Pic f: (UVC, Pf.„ CU), k E domestic, exp ort
Domestic final demand is modelled by a macro consumption function and extended accelerator
investment equations. Private consumption (C) is determined by disposable income (Y) and net (real
and financial) wealth (W).
(3)	 C = (Y,W)
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Revaluations of wealth is modelled only with respect to the value of the housing stock. The real price
on dwellings depends positively on income and negatively on the real interest rate. Gross real
investment (J) depends on production (X) and profitability (PROF). No interest rate effects are
identified except for investment in dwellings.
(4)	 J = fj (X,PROF)
Labour demand (L) is derived from a Cobb-Douglas production function in variable factors, for a
given capital stock, and is determined by
(5)
WC is wage costs per man hour, PM is the price of intermediate inputs and K is the capital stock. The
equations express a significant element of short term labour hoarding when production falls. In the
long run, however, labour increases pari passu with production and depends negatively on the capital
stock. The average estimated elasticity of scale is 1.2. The modelling of the labour market is important
for the overall model properties. Wages are considered to be determined by bargaining between unions
and firms and the following real wage equation is estimated:
(6) W = f,v (PC,Pat,tq,U,Z)
where W is the wage rate received by the employee, PC is consumer price index, t is the average
personal tax rate, PQ is the value added price, tq is the rate of payroll taxes, U is the unemployment
rate and Z is labour productivity. Static and dynamic homogeneity of degree one in prices are
imposed. Consumer prices and product prices each have an estimated long run weight of 0.5 in the
wage equation. According to the model, direct and indirect (via consumer prices) as well as payroll tax
changes are shifted onto wages. In the long run, increased labour productivity is also fully passed
through into real wages. Increased unemployment reduces real wages. The estimations favoured a non-
linear specification of the relationship between wages and unemployment. Thus, changes in
unemployment exert little effect on real wages when =employment exceeds 5 per cent (as in Norway
today), yet much stronger effects when unemployment is below 2.5-3 per cent. The level of
unemployment in our reference path is thus important for the simulation results. At 2.5 per cent
unemployment, real wages increase by 5 per cent in the long run when unemployment is reduced by 1
percentage point, while the raise in real wages is below 1 per cent with an initial unemployment level
of 5 per cent. Household labour supply is specified for different socio-demographic groups. Total
labour supply depends on the number of households in each group. The elasticity with respect to
wages is found to be rather small, but the estimates display a strong «discouraged worker» effect. Thus
employment changes are not fully reflected in unemployment, which modifies the wage-restraining
effect of reduced labour demand.
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In the model, fixed exchange rates represents a basic assumption behind fmancial market behaviour.
Estimations support a hypothesis of long run uncovered interest rate parity. Based on historical
evidence, fmancial markets are assumed to react to changes in the current account with moderate
interest rate adjustments, relative to foreign interest rates. The model contains no formal limitations on
the development of government and/or national net holding of assets. Hence, simulations will only be
meaningful if one reasonably can assume that the calculated government balance will be judged
sustainable by the fmancial markets.
In the short mn, a fiscal expansion works through traditional Keynesian multiplier and accelerator
mechanisms, stimulating production and employment. But it also worsens government balances and
the current account. As profitability increases and unemployment falls, wages gradually start to
increase, partly offsetting the initial employment impulses. The offsetting effects work through
different channels. Increasing wages reduces international competitiveness, thus eroding exports and
increasing import shares. In addition, firms substitute intermediate inputs for labour. But, according to
the model, the crowding out effects in the fmancial markets are not very strong. However, this has to
be viewed in the light of the lacking sustainability conditions for financial stocks.
The degree of crowding out depends critically on the response of wages to unemployment and the
response of market shares to increased domestic production costs. At present levels of unemployment
(5 per cent), MODAG predicts that both effects are modest in magnitude. A partial multiplier analysis
of fiscal policy expansion in MODAG implies some, but not full crowding out in the long run. This is
due to modest wage and market share effects, but also to the lack of long run conditions regarding
fmancial balances. A fiscal expansion reduces government net fmancial assets. If we (somewhat
arbitrarily) impose a rule saying that net fmancial assets shall return to baseline levels at the end of the
simulation period, the crowding out effect, via a necessary reversal of policy, will appear much
stronger. We do not impose such requirements, but in reporting the simulation results, we take the
developments in terminal wealth into account, cf. section 4.
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3 Comparing an EU membership with the EEA treaty
We assess the economic effects of a potential EU-membership as the difference between two scenarios
for the Norwegian economy. The reference scenario reflects the assumption that the present EEA
treaty will stay in force during the entire simulation period of 1995 to 2020. The reference scenario is
then compared to a scenario where Norway is assumed to be a member of the EU. Below, we
summarise the most important assumptions behind the construction of the two scenarios.5
3.1 The reference scenario
The EEA treaty defines Norway - with some limitations - as a full member of the Single Market,
ensuring free movement of services, capital, labour and most goods. Except for trade in agricultural
and fishery products, tariffs and quantitative import restrictions are abandoned between Norway and
the EU. Furthermore, the EEA treaty also includes several regulations prohibiting trade disturbing
measures like production stimulating subsidies, technical trade barriers, trade restricting agreements,
government import monopolies and discriminatory procurement policies. In addition, the treaty
simplified the rules of origin and the border formalities between the EFTA and the EU countries,
reducing the cost of intra EEA trade. Based on the projected strong current account figures, the
Norwegian krone is assumed to be fixed to the ECU. Short run international real interest rates are
believed to stay around 4 per cent. The average growth in import prices is set to 2 per cent a year and
the average growth in GDP among the largest trading partners is set to 2.5-3 per cent up to the year
2000 and 2-2.5 per cent afterwards. As Norway is a large producer of oil and natural gas, the prices on
these products are highly important for the projections. We find it reasonable to impose a 3.5 per cent
growth rate in the real prices of both oil and natural gas up to year 2000 and somewhat below 2 per
cent in the following years. The production of oil and natural gas is supposed to increase the first 5
years and to drop significantly after the turn of the century. Along with these projections, we also
believe that investment in the petroleum sector will follow a decreasing trend6. The level of direct and
indirect taxes are kept constant through the simulation period. Estimated effects of the newly
established WTO treaty are included in the reference path which reduces the potential differences
between the simulated regimes. However, according to Bove et al. (1994), the treaty may only have
marginal impact on the agricultural policy in Norway. Hence, our projection of future agricultural
production along the reference path is based on the historical trend. We assume that the amount of
total agricultural subsidies will fall considerably during the simulation period.
5 For a full documentation of our estimates and assumptions, see Bowitz et al. (1994).
6 Our figures regarding the oil producing activities are based on projections presented by the Ministry of
Industry and Energy (1993-94).
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3.2 Changes associated with the EU-membership scenario
The following presentation of changes from the reference path are based on the negotiated Accession
Treaty (1994) for Norway. The treaty specifies how the changes should be implemented both with
respect to magnitude and time. Along with these stated requirements, we have based our estimates on
interpretations and intentions expressed by the Norwegian government. We assess the direct effects of
an EU membership to be significant within the following economic areas: i) agriculture, ii)
government finances and international trade.
3.2.1 Agriculture and food processing
Although the effective support of the agricultural sector in the EU is significantly higher than the
OECD average, it would still require comprehensive reductions in subsidies and import restrictions if
the Norwegian agricultural sector was to adapt to The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of EU.
Also, implementing the CAP would substantially reduce the market price support to the Norwegian
food processing industry.
The CAP is primarily based on market price support, provided by institutional prices, variable import
levies and market intervention. Only about 10 per cent of the support (channelled through the
European Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF)) is provided to assist farmers in less
favoured areas or other kinds of direct support. Central parts of the existing policy mounted at
assisting Norwegian farmers are in defiance with the CAP. Full participation in the common market
would require that Norwegian agricultural assistance would have to be adjusted to the EU level, and
several subsidies conditioned on production would have to be abolished. However, unaccepted forms
of support could partly be substituted by budgetary transfers from EAGGF or different kinds of
approved national measures. Furthermore, due to the potential entry of three Nordic countries, the EU
expanded the CAP to allow for compensatory government subsidies directed towards low productivity
farms located in the so-called northern areas. This was to sustain the level of production in these
locations, covering approximately 50 per cent of the Norwegian cultivated area. Provided that
production would not be excessively stimulated, the EU also opened for temporary national measures
facilitating integration to the CAP in cases of severe restructuring problems. In addition, some
transitory arrangements were agreed upon for the first 5 years.
In Norway, the food processing industries are mainly assisted by import levies or quantitative import
barriers, partly meant to compensate for the high domestic agricultural prices. Nevertheless, estimates
by Fæhn et a. (1995) indicate a significant effective (net) protection of the Norwegian food processing
industry. Reducing industrial food prices to the EU level would only partly be compensated by the
10
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simultaneous CAP-pricing of agricultural products. In order to facilitate a restructuring of the industry,
the government announced a 4 year investment programme to start from the day of accession. These
subsidies are estimated to approximately 125 million ECU each year (1995 values) and are assumed to
imply a yearly increase in real investments of 95 million ECU.
Table 1 displays main figures for the agricultural and food processing sectors. After a complete de-
escalation of the transitional support to agriculture and food processing, overall budgetary assistance
would fall considerably. The estimated reductions in producer prices of food are based on the
assumption that food import prices will fall to Danish levels, adjusted for transport costs. The
stipulated long run effects on food production are based on results from a disaggregated linear
programming model (Borve et al. (1994)) designed to study the effects of policy changes with respect
to the agricultural and food processing sectors. The transitional development towards the new long run
solution rests on the assumption that existing producers could choose to sustain production activities as
long as the proceeds cover operating costs. In both sectors we have imposed a 10 per cent increase in
average productivity, which result in a long run decline in employment of approximately 1,5-2 per
cent of total employment in 1994.
Table 1. Direct income shifts in Agriculture and Food Processing.
Deviations from the reference path.
3.2.2 Public Finances
As a member of the EU, Norway would have to contribute to the common budget. According to
government calculations, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1994), the gross contribution would have
amounted to approximately one billion ECU in 1995, increasing to about 1.5 billion in year 2000.
Although the gross membership contribution is subject to negotiations, there exist a number of
indicators which broadly determine the level of transfers. These are: the level of GDP and the VAT
and tariff revenues (including taxes on agricultural products imported from third countries). As in most
other EFTA countries, the Norwegian VAT rate (22 per cent when the treaty was negotiated) is
substantially higher than those observed in the EU (excluding Denmark). During the rest of the
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simulation period, the contribution is assumed to grow proportionately with GDP. However, as the
EFTA and EEA contributions would come to an end, the government would probably save
approximately 100 million ECU per year. Accession would also prohibit the present tax on grain feed
(125 million ECU per year ) and the investment tax which amounts to 500 million ECU per year (we
phase this out over five years starting in 1996). A compulsory introduction of value added taxes on
services would have increased government revenue with 100 million ECU the first year and then grow
in line with the tax base. Through the European Investment Bank, Norway would have been obliged to
fmance an estimated outlay of 25 million ECU for four years following accession. Adapting to the
CAP would have reduced direct government subsidies from 1996 on with approximately 350 million
ECU (1995 value). To compensate for lost animal and product values due to imposed price cuts, the
government was allowed to transfer approximately 250 million ECU as a one time subsidy to the
agricultural sector in 1995. As already mentioned, a transition subsidy of 125 million ECU offered
each year from 1995 to 1997 was to be assigned to the food processing industry. In addition we
assume some 160 million ECU in government expenses to co-finance outlays from the EU fund for
reconstruction. Finally, we have removed the Norwegian sugar tax in the calculations and reduced the
tax rates on alcohol and tobacco with 12 per cent to avoid a potentially unacceptable import leak.
Table 2: Direct effects of a membership on government revenue and expenses.
Deviation from reference path in 100 mill. (1995) ECU.
1995	 2000	 2010
Expenses:
Membership contribution
	
9.9	 15.2	 18.6
Subsidies to the agricultural sector
	 2.9	 -3.3	 -3.6
Co-financing the EU fund for reconstruction
	 1.6
	
1.2
	
1.2
Transition subsidies
	 1.2	 0.0	 0.0
The European Investment Bank, EFTA, EEA
	 -0.6	 -0.9	 -0.9
Income:
Grain feed taxes	 -1.2
	
-1.2	 -1.2
Net increase in government expenses:
	 16.3 •	 12.5	 16.6
Repayments from the EU to private sector
	 6.6
	
6.2
	
5.6
Membership contribution
- Repayments from the EU to private sector
= Net
 Economic Contribution	 3.3	 9.1	 13.0
When calculating the net financial contribution to the EU budget, one must also account for transfers
from the EU to the private sector in Norway. Such transfers include general subsidies from the CAP,
fmancial support available through the fund for reconstruction and resources mediated through EU's
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scientific programs. Our estimates of the size of the changes in taxes and other financial variables are
presented in Table 2.
3.2.3 Barriers to trade, border controls and documentation of origin
Norway imports a large variety of industrial products, while exports are mainly concentrated on crude
oil, fish and semi- processed industrial products. About 2/3 of the Norwegian imports and 415 of the
exports are associated with the EU countries. Adapting to the EU trade policy would require changes
in trade with EU members through full integration with the Single Market, and with non-members
through participation in the Customs Union.
As the EEA Treaty is already in force, full integration with the Single Market would only generate
marginal changes. With respect to imports we find that a full integration only has substantial effect on
prices of foods and beverages. With respect to exports a complete opening of the European markets for
fish and fish products is expected to reduce tariffs by approximately 2 per cent. Furthermore, we
expect a general fall in export prices due to minimisation of border formalities between EU members,
as well as elimination of procedural formalities regarding documentation of origin7. The European
Commission (1988) estimated the total gains of removing all border formalities within EU to 1.8 per
cent of the total trade value. There is reason to believe that this number is not representative for the
integration of Norway, as only one border is involved. Furthermore, Norway's exports are to a large
extent bulk sales with marginal exposure to costly border controls. Rules of origin may generate
administration costs and efficiency losses. Herin (1986) estimated these costs between the EU and
EFTA to between 3 and 5 per cent of the products' value. Since 1986, the EEA agreement has reduced
these costs considerably. Summing up the effects, we estimate a 1.5 per cent reduction in the costs of
exporting to the EU. However, due the new GATT/WTO treaty, the cost reduction is scaled down to
0.5 per cent from year 2005.
Customs Union participation would not have a significant impact on Norwegian export conditions.
Import prices, on the other hand, would be somewhat affected. We found that the price changes were
significant for 7 out of 20 aggregates of industrial products. These are reported in Table 3, where the
differences are decomposed into changes in tariffs and tariff equivalents 8 of Non-Tariff-Barriers
(NTBs). We report for the years 1995 and 2005 representing the time of full implementation of an EU
membership and the GATT/WHO treaty respectively. Adjusted tariff policies would mainly affect
Vehicles, Machinery and Chemicals, where MFN tariffs would increase by 5-10 percentage points. For
Textiles and Wearings, there would be a reduction of similar magnitude. However, average changes
7
 We assume that import prices will not change, based on the idea that exporters will collect the gains when
trading with a small country.
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are rather small, inter aha
 reflecting the dominance of imports from the EEA. In general, required
adjustments would be even smaller after the full implementation of the Uruguay Round agreement by
2005.
Table 3. Price changes on imported products as a result of an EU membership - 1995 and 2005.
Value of imports Change in tariff- Change in	 Change in
c.i.f. 1991	 rate with an EU- equivalent tariff import price
(Millions of	 membership	 rate with an EU- with an EU
ECU)	 (percentage	 membership	 membership
points)	 (percentage	 (percentage)
points)
1995	 2005	 1995	 2005	 1995 2005
Competing products
except foo4 beverages and tobacco
Textiles and Clothes
	 1664	 -1.2	 0.6	 1.5	 0.0	 0.3	 0.6
Various Manufacturing products
	 4605	 0.1	 0.1	 0.0	 0.1	 0:1	 0.1
Wood products	 588	 0.1	 0.1	 0.0	 0.0	 0.1	 0.1
Industrial Chemicals
	 987	 0.5	 0.3	 0.0	 0.0	 0.5	 0.3
Metal products, Machinery and
Equipment
	 6104	 0.7	 0.5	 0.2	 0.2	 0.9	 0.7
Non-competing imports
Food and Raw materials	 454	 0.0	 0.0	 39.0	 39.0	 38.8	 38.8
Cars, Tractors etc.	 480	 1.8
	
1.3	 3.1	 3.1	 4.8	 4.3
Measured by their tariff equivalents, changes in the system of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) will also
influence import prices. Norway still imposes some import restrictions on the non-EEA countries, like
MFA export quotas on textiles and clothing 9, discriminating governmental procurement policies and
various technical barriers to trade, see Fæhn et al. (1995). Although the EU operates with a far more
extensive NTB system, adoption would only have small effects on the level of import prices, with
some main exceptions: A Customs Union with EU would increase import prices on citrus fruits by 25
per cents, bananas by 30 percents and sugar by as much as 250 percents. Adopting the MFA
arrangements of the EU on Textiles and Clothing is estimated to raise Norwegian import prices by 1,5
per cent (the differences would vanish after 2005). Norwegian import prices on Vehicles would also
increase within the Customs Union. A heavy excise tax on these products has stimulated foreign
producers to offer a generous discount system on Norwegian imports of cars (see Ham and Nordström
(1995) for further evidence). Because the Commission recently announced measures against
8 The equivalent tariff rate of the NTBs is here defined as the ad valorem tariff rate that would generate the same
reduction in imports.
9 Both Norway and EU participate in the Multi Fibre Arrangement (MFA) of GATT, which opens for
agreements on voluntary export restraints with exporters of low-cost textiles and clothing products.
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-differentiated producer prices within the EU, there is reason to assume that an EU membership would
cut down on these discounts.
4	 Model simulations and sensitivity tests
The effects of a membership are measured as deviations from the EEA simulation. To illustrate some
important aspects of the transition process, we report results for a broad set of macroeconomic
indicators. As outlined in section 2, the short and long run impulses differ in response to the dynamic
adjustments. Hence, a welfare evaluation of the simulation results must depend on how long run
effects are valued relative to short run effects. Our welfare measure is simply based on estimates of the
present value of total consumption (private and public) over the simulation period, adding the
discounted value of last period national wealth.
(7) 1 =	 . + 	  (KT + FT )
i. 0 (1+ RY	 (1+ R)T
The discount rate (R) is set equal to the rate of return on financial assets (F). F, the stock of real capital
(K), and total consumption (C) are all measured in constant prices. In a friction-loose world, the real
rate of return on fmancial assets should equal the rate of return on real investment. Reducing
consumption and increasing investment by one unit in year t would imply an increase in future
consumption which, discounted back to period t, would equal the consumption foregone in period t.
This is however not necessarily the case in MODAG.
Broadly speaking, an EU membership consists of two elements. The first element represents trade and
policy harmonisation, exposing the sheltered agriculture and food-processing industry to free
competition from the EU. We also classify tax harmonisation as belonging to this group. The other
element is linked to the net contributions to the EU budget. We have chosen to simulate the potential
welfare effects of an EU membership in three steps. First, to capture the traditional integration effects,
we ignore the aspects of budgetary contributions (simulation M1). In the second simulation (M2) we
consider both elements but do not impose any restrictions on government finances. Finally, we impose
fiscal policy measures to illustrate the effects of the bugdetary sustainability problems in simulation
M2 (simulation M3).
4.1 Membership without contribution - the M1 simulation
It is assumed that increased foreign competition will force down food prices to Danish levels within
two years. Lower food prices imply ceteris paribus higher purchasing power in the household sector.
In addition, the temporary farmer support will maintain real income for farmers in the very first years
after accession.
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Table 4. Partial effects of EU membership, excluding membership payments (Ml). Difference
from reference simulation in per cent, unless otherwise stated.
2000
	
2010	 2020
Private Consumption	 -0.3
	 0.5	 1.6
Private Investment	 -1.8	 3.2	 2.1
GDP	 -0.4	 0.8	 1.7
Employment	 4.1	 -0.2	 0.2
Government Surplus 1)	 -0.7	 0.0	 4.2
Current Account 1) 	 0.0	 0.3	 0.3
Average Hourly Wage Rate	 -3.5	 -7.7	 -6.1
Consumer Prices	 -3.5	 -6.2	 -5.8
1) In percentage points of GDP
Thus, real household disposable income and private consumption increase somewhat the first years.
But when temporary farm subsidies are faded out by 2000, and the multiplier and accelerator effects
work through, private consumption is lower than in the reference simulation. The same is the case with
GDP and total employment. In Table 4, we present our results emphasising some important
macroeconomic variables. Overall employment is reduced by more than 1 per cent by 2000, and 80-90
per cent of this reduction has taken place in agriculture and food-processing industries. However, due
to the discouraged worker effect unemployment increases by only about one half of the decrease in
employment. Wages are reduced due to increased unemployment and lower consumer prices,
counteracting the positive impetus on real disposable household income from the initial reduction in
food prices. After 2005, wages are about 7 per cent below reference levels, a difference that is kept
approximately unchanged until year 2020. The fall in wages boosts exports and induces factor
substitution into labour, gradually restoring equilibrium in the labour market. In the first 10 to 15 years
after the policy change production does not change much because the positive impulses from improved
competitiveness are counteracted by negative impulses from domestic demand. In 2010, GDP is larger
than in the reference simulation, although employment is still slightly below. After 25 years,
employment is also higher than in the reference scenario.
Average labour productivity increases during the first years mainly due to the imposed rationalisation
in the agricultural sector and the food-processing industries. If these industries are excluded, value
added per man-hour hardly changes until 2010. But while activity in many sectors increases and the
economy recovers, productivity in other sectors also increases 10. By 2020, labour productivity in the
10
 Productivity in the government sector is assumed to follow the National Accounts convention of an
autonomous productivity growth, and we have not changed the rate of growth of productivity in this sector, due
to EU membership. The same applies to the petroleum sector.
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mainland private sector excluding the agriculture and food-processing industries is one per cent higher
than in the reference simulation. The reason why productivity increases in other sectors in the long run
is to be found in the increasing returns to scale properties of the implicit production functions of the
model. During the first years, the government surplus is reduced due to the temporary increase in farm
subsidies and lower tax revenues as a consequence of harmonisation to lower levels in EU. From 2000
on, changes are small both in the government balance and the current account.
4.2 Membership including contribution - the M2 simulation
This simulation is identical to the Ml simulation, except that the net contribution to EU's common
budget is included. Since fiscal policy is not changed, the government budget balance deteriorates
alongside the current account. In the M2 simulation a fall in government surplus of 1.7 percentage
point of GDP in 2030 grows to 3.4 percentage points in 2020. The current account deteriorates with an
amount corresponding to 1 percentage point of GDP in year 2000 and 2.8 percentage points in year
2020. Due to accumulated interest payments the difference in the surpluses tends to increase through
time. Disposable income for Norway is reduced. Contrary to the M1 simulation, domestic interest rates
increase slightly compared to the levels in the reference simulation due to a weakening current
account. Since there are no strong links to interest rate effects in MODAG, the other macroeceonomic
variables are found to change almost identically to what was observed in the M1 simulation.
4.3 Membership with fiscal restraint - the M3 simulation
Without offsetting policy actions, the net contribution to the EU's common budget worsens both the
current account and the government balance. Modelling the lia between government and national
debt and exchange rate expectations and interest rates is complex, and MODAG is not very
sophisticated in this respect. However, we believe that agents in the fmancial markets will assess the
development of public finances and the current account when judging the likely future course of the
exchange rate. In our analysis, we have measured the effects on these balances as differences from the
reference simulations.
In order to assume unchanged exchange rates and a small interest rate increase (as in the M2
simulation), the current account and government balance must be sustainable. Whether they will be
sustainable after imposing an EU-membership depends on the likely development in the case of
Norway not being an EU-member, i.e. on the surpluses in the reference simulation. According to the
Maastricht definitions, the 1994 current account surplus was 3.3 per cent of GDP and there was a
government deficit of 0.7 per cent of GDP. In the reference simulation, the present cyclical upturn
together with increased petroleum revenues in the first part of the simulation period makes both these
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surpluses relatively comfortable. Even though the difference between the size of the two balances in
the M2 and the reference simulations increase throughout the simulation period, the economy does,
nevertheless, fulfil the budgetary requirements of the Maastricht treaty. However, if the reference
simulation is too optimistic regarding fiscal solvency, the estimated weakening of the government
budget may be seen as too large. Also, if the assumed policy of the M2 simulation was extended
beyond 2020, the Maastricht criteria would have been violated further into the future.
In the M3 simulation we have constructed a policy package to reduce the adverse effects on
government balances due to the EU-membership contribution. We note that the necessary size of the
package will depend on the choice of fiscal instruments. To mention but one example - private
consumption is a lot more import-intensive than government consumption. However, we do not want
to focus on the effectiveness of different fiscal instruments in obtaining macroeconomic goals.
Consequently we have constructed a broad fiscal policy package consisting of a reduction in
government consumption and subsidies, an increase in personal and payroll taxes and in some excise
taxes. In quantitative terms, the package reduces government consumption by 0.6 per cent, and
increases the average household tax rate by 1 percentage point (averaging 0.5 per cent of GDP).
Subsidies are reduced by 0.2 per cent.
The effects of the policy package are summarised in Table 5 below. Implementing the package appears
to have significant negative effects on production, employment and revenues, according to our
simulations. The fiscal policy contraction has long-lasting negative impacts on domestic production,
consumption and employment, yet the end-of-simulation net financial and real wealth increases. The
most important question is whether the working of the economy enables the authorities to reduce
consumption in the beginning of the simulation period in order to obtain higher consumption later
without real losses. Table 5 below suggests that this is not the case.
Table 5. Partial effects of a membership-induced fiscal contraction. Difference from the M2
simulation in per cent unless otherwise stated.
2000
	
2010	 2020
Private Consumption	 -2.5	 -3.6	 -4.6
Private Investment 	 -4.2	 4.0	 -4.3
GDP	 -2.3
	
-3.0	 -3.4
Employment	 -2.6	 -2.9	 -2.9
Government Surplus 1)	 1.9	 2,2	 3.4
Current Account 1)
	 1.3
	
2.9	 3.4
Average Hourly Wage Rate	 2.2	 2.1	 0.4
Consumer Prices	 1.9
	
2.4
	
2.1
1) In percentage points of GDP
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As the fiscal contraction reduces employment, nominal wages continue to increase. The main reason
for this is to be found in the shifting of taxes onto wages. According to the econometrics of MODAG,
increased direct and indirect personal taxes will increase nominal wages in order to maintain real
disposable wages. Hence, the policy package counteracts the competitive gains in the
 Ml simulation.
4.4 EU-membership and the impact on welfare
In this section we present welfare evaluation of the different outcomes based on equation (7). In all
simulations the discount factor was set equal to the real short run interest rate which averages 4 per
cent. Sensitivity tests showed that discount factors of 3 and 5 per cent gave practically the same
results. Net wealth increases by 0.1 per cent when the net membership contribution is ignored. In the
Ml simulation average private and public consumption exceeds the level in the reference simulation
by 0.4 per cent per year. However, in the first part of the simulation period, consumption on average
was negatively affected by an EU-membership due to less than full capacity utilisation. The present
value of total consumption increased by 0.3 per cent, while net national financial assets declined
significantly.
Table 6. Welfare measured by the discounted value of wealth and consumption.
Percentage difference from reference simulation. Discount factor: 4 per cent.
Simulation
M 1 (no contribution)	 0.1
M 2 (incl. Contribution)	 -0.9
M 3 (also incl. fiscal restraint)	 -3.2
When accounting for the membership contribution (the M2 simulation), national wealth is negatively
affected. A policy designed to prevent the reduction in net financial assets implied by the M2
simulation, imposes an additional real loss on the economy. This is clear from Table 5 and illustrated
in a compact form in Table 6. Total wealth is reduced by 3.2 per cent when membership is combined
with a fiscal policy package (the M3 simulation) aimed at restoring the government sector surplus of
the reference simulation. Because of the increasing returns to scale properties, a lower level of activity
generates lower productivity. Value added in the private mainland sector (excluding the housing
sector) declines by some 1.2 per cent in 2020 as GDP is reduced by more than 3 per cent. This is one
of the reasons why consumption possibilities are reduced by a fiscal contraction.
4.5 Sensitivity tests
One may of course cast doubt on the reliability of these results by questioning the estimated
parameters of the model. Often, the assumptions regarding the responsiveness of real wages to changes
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in unemployment and the responsiveness of domestic firms' market shares to changes in domestic
costs appear to be crucial in studies of this kind, as is the case with the scale elasticities. Clearly, by
assuming constant returns to scale, the effect of a fiscal contraction on consumption would not have
been that significant. Furthermore, more «optimistic» assumptions regarding price elasticities in
foreign trade and wage responsiveness to unemployment might have altered the negative effects on the
economy. As the model predicts relatively small wage responses to short run reductions in
employment, it is of interest to try to assess alternative assumptions regarding the wage formation. A
move in this direction can be interpreted as approaching the properties of a CGE model where a more
smoothly clearing labour market and larger elasticities in foreign trade are common assumptions. This
would unquestionably force our model to be less consistent with the results of most time series based
empirical studies of the Norwegian economy. However, as our aim is to study the problems of
transition in a field where other researchers have focused on static long run gains and losses of a trade
policy reform, this may be of interest.
Table 7. Two tests of sensitivity. Per cent difference in welfare from reference simulation.
Simulations	 All trade elasticities increased by a	 The level of unemployment set to 2.5 per
factor of 3	 cent from 2005 on
M 1 (no contribution)	 1.6
	
0,2
M 2 (incl. contribution)
	 -0.2	 -0.8
M 3 (also ind. fiscal restraint)	 -2.4	 -3.4
Hence, in Table 7 we present sensitivity tests with respect to the elasticities of trade and the
responsiveness of real wages to changes in unemployment. This responsiveness depends considerably
on the initial unemployment level. Hence we represent an increase in the responsiveness with a
reduction in the level of unemployment in the reference simulation". Larger trade elasticities produce
more favourable results in all simulations. The pure «increased exposure» effect now amounts to an
increase of 1.6 per cent in total wealth. Nevertheless, the effect of EU membership is still marginally
negative even without a fiscal contraction. The change in wealth in the case of an EU membership
combined with the policy package is reduced from -3.2 per cent to -2.4 per cent. Hence, it is
reasonable to claim that the qualitative results provided by this model are not very sensitive with
respect to these elasticities.
Unemployment will probably not be altered much in any direction in the near future. It is a lot more difficult
to assess whether unemployment after year 2000 will be 4-4.5 or 2.5 per cent. In order to assess the effects of
different future unemployment levels, we have constructed an alternative reference simulation where the error
terms in the econometric equations have been adjusted so that unemployment declines to 2.5 per cent in 2005
and stays constant until 2020. All other variables are identical to their original reference simulation values. We
once again simulate the effects of an EU-membership applying the basic model version with the historically
estimated trade price elasticities.
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Perhaps a little surprisingly, the effects of increasing the responsiveness of real wages to changes in
unemployment do not seem to change the effects reported in Table 6. One reason for this is that
unemployment is assumed equal to the level in the original reference simulation the first years after
accession (see footnote 10) where the largest shocks were to take place. But this is not the entire
explanation. The wage reductions are in fact significantly larger under this alternative, and factor
substitution contributes to moderate the negative employment effects of an EU-membership. However,
in addition to reducing labour costs, lower real wages also generates a reduction in real household
income and private consumption. Still, it raises profitability and encourages investment. The net effect
on domestic demand is nevertheless negative. Neither seems the positive effects on net exports to be
large enough to offset the negative effect on domestic demand. The magnitude of the fiscal contraction
behind the estimates in Table 7 is the same as in the M3 simulation in Table 6. However, it generates a
larger reduction in real wages and consequently in domestic demand. Together with the increasing
returns to scale property, it generates a fall in productivity growth and consumption possibilities.
5 Concluding remarks
Our simulations give a somewhat pessimistic impression of the potential economic gains of Norwegian
integration and membership in the European Union. Although the pure effects of integration presented
in the Ml-simulation are slightly positive in terms of our welfare measure, the under-utilisation of
labour and capital in sectors most severely exposed to increased foreign competition, i.e. agriculture
and food processing, implies reduced production and income during the first half of the simulation
period. However, lower real wages generate a gradual increase in activity in more productive sectors,
and reinforced by increasing returns to scale, production and income are found to be above the
reference scenario levels during the latter half of the simulation period. The positive integration effects
are, however, not strong enough to counteract the cost of the net contribution to the common budget,
as displayed in the M2 simulation 12. The M3 simulation shows that this is especially so if fiscal policy
is modified to maintain the public sector budget balance.
The study illustrates that there are limits to how much a country can contribute to the union without
loosing the gains from integration. In the case of Norway and the EU, the repayments through CAP
and other membership funds are not sufficiently large to generate an over all gain from a membership.
Since the remaining EFTA members are quite similar with respect to the importance of the agricultural
sector, we claim that the outlined effects of a membership might be important for these countries too.
In addition, the study illuminates important transitory mechanisms, first of all rooted in the functioning
12 Recently, the Norwegian GDP figures have been revised upwards by more than 10 per cent due to new
international standards. If the study was based on the these numbers, the results in the M2 and M3 simulations
would probably have appeared to be even more negative as a result of increased net contributions.
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of the labour market, which adjust slowly to this kind of policy changes. The parameters of the model
are estimated on times series data, and the relationships broadly capture the historical dynamics of the
Norwegian economy. Since it has been claimed that the reported results depend heavily on the actual
values of a small set of key parameters, we have performed sensitivity calculations with respect to the
real wage responsiveness to changes in labour market conditions and the absolute values of the trade
elasticities. The first modification of the model did not significantly alter our predictions but the
increased sensitivity of foreign trade to relative prices magnified the pure integration effects of an EU-
membership. However, even a threefold increase in the trade elasticities was not sufficient to alter the
qualitative conclusions of our calculations.
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